Readify

“Trust that man in nothing, who has not a Conscience in every thing.”

The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman

The expression “Trust that man in nothing, who has not a Conscience in every thing” is the culminating rule in Yorick’s advice about conscience: trust depends not on a person’s profession of belief, but on whether conscience governs all of that person’s conduct.

Context and Form

The sentence appears near the end of Yorick’s short set of maxims, immediately before his further distinction between conscience and law. Its opening, “In a word,” presents it as a compressed conclusion to the cautions that precede it, while the balanced phrases “in nothing” and “in every thing” give the rule its memorable, absolute form.

Meaning and Ethical Force

The expression makes consistency the test of trustworthiness. A person who recognizes conscience only in selected cases cannot be relied upon: the maxim treats moral judgment as a general obligation rather than a convenient claim. Its breadth is sharpened by the contrast between “nothing” and “every thing,” turning an apparently simple aphorism into a demand that conscience extend across the whole range of conduct.

Relation to the Following Rule

Yorick’s next sentence guards against confusing conscience with the source of law. God and reason make the law; conscience is placed within a person to determine and faithfully declare that law, not to create a new one according to changing passions. The image of a British judge contrasts principled judgment with an Asiatic Cadi swayed by personal passions. Read alongside that explanation, the expression does not endorse conscience as an unquestionable private authority: it calls for conscience to be present consistently while subjecting its judgments to a law grounded in God and reason.

Rhetorical Role

As the passage’s concluding maxim, the expression joins personal trust to the larger argument about moral judgment. Its compact parallel structure makes it easy to recall, but its surrounding explanation supplies an important qualification: constancy alone is not enough if conscience is mistaken for law or bent by passion. The final appeal is therefore both practical and corrective—trust requires conscience in every matter, and conscience must faithfully answer to a standard beyond personal appetite.